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1 What happened in Russia in January-February 1730? It is absolutely clear that neither for
the readers nor for the authors is the issue simply one of reconstructing the course of
events. The attempt by a group of imperial dignitaries to establish a limited monarchical
regime  during  the  interregnum;  the  difficult  and  in  many  ways  enforced  dialogue
between the verkhovniki (the members of the Supreme Privy Council) and the shljakhetstvo
(the  nobility);  the  short  but  extraordinarily  strong  outburst  of  political  creativity
displayed by various groups of the nobility; and finally, the collapse of the “intrigue” and
the restoration of autocratic power – all of this is basic textbook-level information. But
the questions which inevitably follow from our acquaintance with the events described
are very complicated; so too is the evaluation of these events, owing to the importance
and significance of what happened. For at no later time, in the entire course of Russian
imperial  history,  was  there  a  more  radical  and  realizable  (that’s  why  we  will  leave
“Decembrism”  out  of  the  equation)  encroachment  on  the  sovereign  rights  of  the
monarch. The authors note that “within five weeks the imperial power established by
Peter I was significantly limited, and in another ‘configuration’ of political forces these
limitations  could  have  become  an  important  factor  in  the  future  course  of  Russian
history” (p. 5). In my own view they did to a certain extent become such a factor, bearing
in mind the impact of these limitations on the subsequent socio-political thought of the
Russian elite and therefore on the political life of the country. 
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2 Almost all students of the short period of the interregnum in 1730 have tried in various
ways to interpret the attempt of the in the context of the whole course of the national
political  experience.  But,  as  we  can  see  from  the  detailed  and  comprehensive
historiographical  research of  Kurukin and Plotnikov (p. 7-24),  no common conceptual
evaluation has yet been formed. Questions were formulated and became established in
the literature, and the differences between authors’ interpretations, from Tatishchev to
the present day, depended on their combinations of the answers to these questions. Who
were the verkhovniki? The bearers of  constitutional  ideas,  or dignitaries who tried to
impose an oligarchic form of  governance according to the interests of  the old boyar
families? What did their political demarche potentially involve? The chance of another
course of development for Russia or the realization of the ideals of a “party” for the
restoration of the pre-Petrine order? What did the shljakhetstvo that took part in the
events in  1730  represent:  a  homogeneous  autocratic  opposition  or  an  internally
heterogeneous  milieu displaying  “constitutionalist”  and  “reactionary”  wings?  Is  it
possible to consider the nobles’  actions as an indicator of  a new qualitative stage of
development of the national political culture, and of the growth of the social and political
maturity of the service class? Or was their behavior no more than momentary risk-taking,
explained  by  their  patron-client  relationships  with  the  “powerful  people”?  Was  the
nobles’  ultimate  preference  for  autocratic  government  a  sign  of  their  stagnant  and
reactionary character,  or  an indication of  their  loyalty to the “precepts of  Peter the
Great”? The study and interpretation of the role of the year 1730 in Russian history had
reached an impasse in Soviet academic literature. According to the authors’ conviction,
this  situation  can  be  overcome  only  as  a  result  of  a  reassessment  of  the  existing
interpretations, a new and detailed understanding of the positions of different groups of
the  shljakhetstvo,  the  identification  of  the  level  of  the  actors’  political  concepts  and
attitudes, and the utilization of new sources discovered by the authors (p. 29-30).
3 The achievement of the declared goals was a difficult process. Kurukin and Plotnikov had
to begin it ab ovo – they created the first full academic publication of sources on the
history  of  the  events  of  early  1730,  which  includes  both  documents  that  have  been
already published, and new materials discovered by the authors. It consists of five blocks:
1) editions of the “conditions,” documents of the Supreme Privy Council, and political
projects of the shljakhetstvo and verkhovniki from fond no. 3 of the Russian State Archive of
Ancient  Acts  (RGADA);  2)  legislative  acts  of  the  Supreme  Privy  Council  and  Anna
Ioannovna,  which were published in the Complete  Collection of  Laws of  the Russian
Empire (Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii) and in the collections of the Imperial
Russian Historical Society, supplemented by documents from fond no. 176 of RGADA; 3)
an extensive number of documents created by the supreme and central state institutions,
from the fonds of RGADA and the Russian State Military-Historical Archive (RGVIA); 4)
diplomatic materials which have been fairly extensively, but not always satisfactorily,
published  in  the  collections  of  the  Imperial  Russian  Historical  Society,  significantly
supplemented  with  documents  from  RGADA;  5)  private  documents,  personal
correspondence and memoirs which were published in the 19th - 20 th centuries. These
documents  occupy half  of  the  book,  and if  they  do  not  entirely  exhaust  the  source
possibilities for the problem under investigation in terms of their scope and variety, they
certainly come very close to doing so.  It  is  valuable that,  thanks to the collection of
published documents, the reader has the opportunity to participate in the research, to
substantially agree or polemicize with its conclusions and logic; such an opportunity is
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provided very seldom because of the traditional system of references to secondary and
primary sources; and it undoubtedly, enhances the scholarly importance of the book.
4 In the main part of the book, in a minute, concise, capacious and at the same time highly
readable style, the authors reveal the chronology of events, but more importantly the
complicated interweaving of the ideas, positions and motives of the actions of all the
individuals involved in the thick of political events of the winter of 1730. Kurukin and
Plotnikov  have  managed  to  produce  a  very  harmonious  combination  of  textological
approaches and prosopographical analysis. The results of the latter are reinforced by data
on the service position, types of service, age characteristics, and the estate- and serf-
possessions of the participants in the “project of the majority,” which are compiled in
tables and diagrams in the appendices. These create a multi-dimensional and distinctive
collective portrait of the most active part of the Russian nobility, the basis of which was
formed by middle-ranking veteran administrators, the generation of the reforms, and the
“backbone” of the Empire created by Peter the Great. 
5 The  prosopographical  reconstruction  undertaken  by  Kurukin  and  Plotnikov  made  it
entirely possible to reveal the main behavioral models of the noble groups and their
internal horizontal ties,  and it  served as an important basis for the formation of the
authors’ conception of the events of 1730. The authors’ central thesis that “the idea of the
limitation  of  autocratic  power  arose  directly  inside  the  autocratic  state  apparatus”
(p. 113),  is  extremely  convincing.  It  overcomes  the  labyrinth  of  interconnected  and
unilinear binary oppositions traditionally employed in the historiography (“oligarchs”/
constitutionalists,  old  aristocracy/new  gentry,  progressives/traditionalists,  etc.).  The
authors suggest that one should look at the main participants in the events through the
prism of the evolution of the Russian state apparatus which took place in the first third of
the 18th century. In spite of the “convulsive” character of the administrative changes of
Peter the Great, in a very short time (in historical terms) there emerged in the country a
certain stratum of the upper and central bureaucracy that realized (or had sensed) its
ability to manage the state administration without the strong and integrating figure of
the  monarch.  According  to  the  authors,  the  fact  that  the  bureaucratic  apparatus  of
autocracy had acquired the features of a kind of “self-governing mechanism” had the
potential to bring about Russia’s transformation into a “non-autocratic” monarchy. This
view provides a new explanation not only for the participation of different groups of
nobility in the political movement, but also for the instability and heterogeneity of their
positions. The shljakhetstvo,  which was unexpectedly involved in deciding the Empire’s
fate,  should also  be  considered primarily  as  a  part  of  the  bureaucracy (the  authors’
research makes this obvious) – the middle-level bureaucracy.
6 Like  the  verkhovniki,  the  middle-level  administrators  were  both  the  agents  and  the
“products” of the reforms, so they fully accepted both the aim of a “break with former
tradition” and the necessity of having “legally more defined relations between rulers and
subjects” (p. 115). Besides, for all of the participants in the events encluding the authors
of the boldest projects, “the transformation of the state system by no means implied any
changes in the social system” (p. 113). Between the verkhovniki and a significant part of
the shljakhetstvo (at least, before the arrival of Anna Ioannovna in Russia) there was no
real  divergence on the question of  the limitation of the monarch’s  power.  But there
existed  a  misunderstanding  about  the  bounds  of  this  limitation.  While  the  higher
bureaucracy  of  the  Empire,  and  groups  of  the  noble  shljakhetstvo related  to  it,  were
prepared for a “deliberate act of destruction of the autocracy” (p. 114), for many of the
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old “Petrine servitors,” who had experienced the Northern War and the administrative
reforms of the first  quarter of  the century,  the elimination of  subordination to state
power,  to  which  such  a  sharp  and  frank  limitation  of  autocracy  could  lead,  was
unthinkable. In the last resort, this divergence proved fatal for the verkhovniki.
7 Examining the political situation of the winter of 1730 through the prism of the evolution
of the state apparatus does not contradict the other well-known factors which influenced
the course of events, like the disparate levels of political culture, the fragmentation of the
Russian nobility and the personal ambitions of the verkhovniki.  But the interpretation
proposed  by  Kurukin  and  Plotnikov  makes  it  possible  at  last  to  reject  some
historiographical cliches. First of all,  the aristocratic affiliation of the majority of the
verkhovniki did not make them the adherents of some reactionary forces, the leaders of a
non-existent “old-Russian party.” Secondly, it must be recognized that the influence of
the notorious “Swedish models” or of the theoretical treatises of European authors about
the forms of state system on the practical actions of the verkhovniki has been greatly
exaggerated. Without denying the familiarity of A.I. Osterman with the state system of
Sweden, or the acquaintance of Prince D.M. Golitsyn with the works of John Locke, the
verkhovniki  can hardly be depicted as  followers  of  their  ideas.  Their  actions were an
immediate result of the Petrine reforms, of that new quality which the system of Russian
statehood had acquired by the end of the first third of the 18th century. Hence it, thirdly,
follows that it is hardly right to call the members of the Supreme Privy Council of 1730
either “constitutionalist” or “oligarchic” gouvernment. Kurukin and Plotnikov offer the
entirely  correct  and effective  term “non-autocratic”  monarchy for  the  form of  state
system which  might  have  been  established  if  the  plans  of  the  verkhovniki  had  been
implemented; a monarchy which is legitimately headed by the upper bureaucracy. The
authors consider that “the movement towards ‘non-autocratic’ monarchy in Russia was
forcibly interrupted” (p. 116), and this is, perhaps, the only point on which my opinion
diverges, for it seems to me that despite the failure of the specific project of 1730, Russian
statehood subsequently developed in roughly this direction by the next century. 
8 On the whole the conceptualization proposed by Kurukin and Plotnikov certainly enables
us to see a way out of the historiographical impasse in the understanding of the political
situation of the interregnum in 1730, and allows a fresh perspective on the actions of the
members of  the Supreme Privy Council  as  a  starting point  in the history of  Russian
“enlightened bureaucracy.”
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